16 JULY 2002
15 JULY 2002: “Music
is not the food of love. The pies are so much better.”
“This was the Glastonbury
of food, Pastie-onbury, maybe except I didn’t have
a pastie. But man, the Square
Pie Company was for me the equal of Pulp
headlining in 1995.
Their World Cup Pie cam with a bostin’ mash and gravy
that could mount a healthy
takeover bid on Heavens Ambrosia”
Caitlin Moran, The Times, Mon 1st July
Quick update on the Square
Pie World Cup, apologies for the late result but
we’ve all been down in Glastonbury
Festival selling pies, which was
fantastic.
The Pie World Cup finished
on Sunday with a play off between the favourites
England Steak and Kidney
Pie and the dependable Irish Lamb Stew. Both teams
went for it from the beginning
and in the highest scoring game of the
tournament so far both teams
sold out by the end of the day – we had made
the same amount of each
to be fair. In the end the Cup went to the English
Steak and Kidney on a Golden
Pie as they sold out quicker than the Irish.
The Steak and Kidney will
now become a permanent fixture on the Square Pie
menu at the shop in Spitalfields
Market and after some great reaction other
world cup pies will come
back as weekly special now and then, namely the
Uruguayan Rabbit, Spanish
Chorizo, French Beef Bourguignon, Irish Lamb Stew
and the amazing Senegalese
Chicken Yasser. We will never sell a
German
Bratwurst
and Sauer Kraut pie again.
Other pie news, the shop
has just adopted Gordon the baby Orangutan at
Monkey World in Dorset
and will be making a special pie in the shop based on
what the primates eat
down there. Well that’s the idea. We’re chatting to
the wardens down there and
the chimps seem to have pretty upmarket
tatsetbuds so we’ll let
you know when we come up with the final recipe. For
each sale of these pies
we will make a donation to Monkey World which
rehabilitates abused Chimps,
Orangs and other primates. More on this to
come soon when we sort it
all out.
Also heres a good pie link
http://www.weebl.pwp.blueyonder.co.uk/b3ta/pie.html
Thanks
Martin
Any more info please see
the website www.squarepiecompany.com
or call Martin
on 07785 535607
The Square Pie Company
27 Parmiter Industrial Centre
Parmiter St
London
E2 9HZ
Tel: 020 8980
2051
Mob: 07785 535607
14 JULY 2002: WHAT POOR
FARMERS HAVE BEEN REDUCED TO.


(LEFT)
An armed boy walks away from a fire in San Salvador Atenco. About 900 policemen
have surrounded the site of the standoff.
(Agence France-Presse)
(RIGHT) Residents of San Salvador Atenco capture and disarm a policeman,
center. Farmers in the Mexican town are holding hostages to protest the
expropriation of their land for an airport. (Associated Press)
FROM THE
L.A. TIMES:
Mexican Farmers Take 3
More Hostages
Standoff: Now holding 15
captives, they demand formal talks in land dispute.
By RICHARD BOUDREAUX, Times
Staff Writer
MEXICO CITY — Farmers armed
with machetes and homemade firebombs took three more hostages Saturday
and demanded formal negotiations to end their violent standoff with the
government over plans to build an airport on their land 18 miles northeast
of Mexico City.
The showdown was in its third
day with no sign of a breakthrough. Hundreds of protesters are now holding
15 captives in the tense, barricaded town of San Salvador Atenco, which
is surrounded by about 900 riot policemen. Police have jailed two protest
leaders and 10 followers.
Federal authorities last
October ordered 13,300 acres in the rural municipality expropriated for
the $2.3-billion airport, setting off months of sporadic protests that
exploded in violence late Thursday. The farmers seized government offices
in the town, abducted local officials, hijacked and burned vehicles, and
attacked policemen with machetes. About 30 people were injured.
Protest organizers and officials
of the state of Mexico have been on the phone at least five times since
then, trying to work out an exchange of captives.
Those talks hit a snag Friday,
despite jailed protest leader Ignacio del Valle’s telephone appeal to followers
to accept the state’s offer. Under that proposal, Del Valle and Adan Espinoza,
who face charges of inciting violence and stabbing a policeman, would stay
in jail but the 10 other protesters and all the hostages would go free.
A rowdy assembly of farmers
in the town’s auditorium shouted down the proposal. Participants said Del
Valle must have endorsed it under duress. “They’re torturing him!” one
farmer shouted.
At a news conference late
Friday, other protesters again insisted on the release of all 12 prisoners.
They demanded that the federal government, not the state, take charge of
the conflict and agree to formal negotiations through a mediator. They
proposed three human rights champions to play that role.
President Vicente Fox’s administration
has tried to stay out of the conflict, saying the airport construction
would continue as planned. However, Interior Minister Santiago Creel said
federal officials were ready to negotiate with any group disposed to a
peaceful settlement–but would “act with a firm hand to avoid an increase
of violence.”
About 34,000 people live
in villages and farmland destined for the new six-runway facility that
would replace Mexico City’s Benito Juarez International Airport. Many object
that the federal government’s offer to buy their land for 70 cents per
square meter is too low, while others refuse to leave at any price.
The dispute has put Fox’s
government at odds with its erstwhile leftist ally, the Democratic Revolution
Party. Rosario Robles, the party’s leader, called Saturday for a “human
fence” around San Salvador Atenco, saying its residents must be protected.
The protesters took three
more hostages Saturday, identifying them as undercover state police officers
posing as journalists.
For the second day in a row,
leaders of the uprising brought hostages before TV cameras to show that
they had not been harmed. They include several policemen and state officials.
Some took the opportunity to talk to reporters.
“I call on my superiors,
on state officials and on President Fox not to abandon us,” said Jose Andres
Mediola, a deputy state prosecutor and the most prominent hostage. “I want
to go home. I want to feel like authorities and the government are doing
all they can to get me there.”
13 JULY 2002: “IN ECUADOR’S
BANANA FIELDS, CHILD LABOR IS KEY TO PROFITS.”

A group of 10- and 11-year-old
boys outside an
Ecuadorean banana plantation
where they work.
Child labor has endured
in Latin America
despite efforts to abolish
it.
FROM THE
NEW YORK TIMES:
July 13, 2002
In Ecuador’s Banana Fields,
Child Labor Is Key to Profits
By JUAN FORERO
PUERTO INCA, Ecuador At
Los Álamos plantation, it would appear that no expense was spared
to produce the Bonita brand Cavendish bananas sold in the United States.
The modern 3,000-acre hacienda
in this steamy corner of Ecuador, one of the most efficient in Latin America,
employs some 1,300 workers to tend banana plants fed by a state-of-the-art
irrigation system.
The owner is Álvaro
Noboa, Ecuador’s richest man and a worldly bon vivant. He has become the
leading candidate for president with the help of a slick marketing campaign
that has cast him as a populist friend of the poor. “I love the workers
at Los Álamos,” Mr. Noboa told local reporters in May, when he announced
his candidacy.
But in interviews, a dozen
children and many adults spoke of child laborers at Los Álamos,
among them a spindly-armed 10-year-old, Esteban Menéndez. “I come
here after school and I work here all day,” Esteban said. “I have to work
to help my father, to help him make money.”
The presence of children
on the plantation of a man who may win Ecuador’s presidential election
in October is one of the more glaring examples of how enduring the use
of child labor remains in Latin America, where some 42
million children from ages 5 to 14 have been estimated to be working
in recent years.
The problem has been made
more durable still by the competition that comes with a consolidated global
market. Pressures on businesses to be efficient and profitable are often
passed on to the world’s most vulnerable population, its poorest children.
Growers and exporters here,
who supply 25 percent of the bananas eaten in the United States, say the
product earns them about 30 percent less today than a decade ago, often
prompting them to turn a blind eye to labor codes. Child labor is common
on plantations, large and small.
Meanwhile, grim economic
realities leave families more than ready to send their boys, and sometimes
girls, out to work, even if it means pulling them out of school and placing
them in fields or factories where they are exposed to hazardous conditions
for little or no pay.
For two years, Esteban and
his family say, the boy has bounded up 15-foot banana plants, tying insecticide-laced
cords between them to stabilize trunks that might otherwise collapse under
the weight of the produce that is behind Mr. Noboa’s fortune of over $1
billion.
He works for nothing to help
his father, who tends 98 acres, avoid having his pay docked.
“That is the life of my sons,
working in the bananas at such a young age,” said Esteban’s mother, Benita
Menéndez, 36, who has had three sons working at Mr. Noboa’s plantation,
only one of them an adult. “I did not want them to work when they were
little, but this is the reality.”
Ecuador’s problem is less
severe than that of other countries in the region. Even so, the International
Labor Organization estimated that 69,000 children ages 10 to 14, and an
additional 325,000 young people ages 15 to 19, were working here in 1999.
Only a significant increase
in wages, at best a distant prospect in a country where the average worker
earns $5.74 a day, will keep families from sending their children out into
the fields, labor advocates here and in the United States say.
But while rights activists
regard such labor as unacceptable, many parents like Mr. and Mrs. Menéndez
see it as a necessity.
When several plantations,
fearing unwanted attention, dismissed their child workers after a damning
114-page report in April by Human Rights Watch, the action was taken as
a disaster by families across the lush banana belt of southern Ecuador
the world’s largest banana exporter and an increasingly important source
for American corporations like Dole and Del Monte, according to the report.
“They fired all the children,
but the work they did helped us,” complained María Narváez,
31, whose two sons, Néstor and Luis Boa, 12 and 13, were dismissed
from a big hacienda where they earned $3 a day. “The situation is such
that we all have to pitch in.”
At Los Álamos, which
supplies the world’s fourth-largest banana company, labor conditions have
become increasingly contentious. Employees’ efforts to organize for better
wages and working conditions led to a violent standoff this year a dispute
that simmers today in the form of an intermittent strike by some families,
including Esteban’s own.
The workers unionized in
March. The company responded by dismissing more than 120 of them.
When the workers occupied
part of the hacienda, guards armed with shotguns, some wearing hoods, arrived
at 2 a.m. on May 16, according to workers, and fired on some who had refused
to move from the entrance gate, wounding two.
The guards, workers said,
then entered the grounds and burst into barracks where other workers were
sleeping and forced them out.
The next afternoon, workers
again gathered at the gate, where they parked a bus across the road to
block delivery trucks. The guards confronted them again, this time wounding
seven more including Esteban’s father, Bernabé Menéndez
and a policeman.
“It was an attack on innocent
people,” said Jan Nimmo, a Scottish labor advocate who was with the workers
that day and videotaped the afternoon confrontation at the gate.
Mr. Noboa’s lawyer, Rafael
Pino, attributed the violence to the workers, saying the guards had been
sent in to protect property that was being vandalized. “At no moment were
there shots from our side,” he said.
But the violence prompted
the United States Embassy to ask the government to ensure the safety of
the striking workers. An American delegation that included two members
of Congressional staffs visited Los Álamos workers in June.
“This is sort of the underbelly
of globalization,” said Representative George Miller, a California Democrat
who sent an aide to Ecuador.
“We ask for labor protections
and we ask for environmental protections,” Mr. Miller said, “and we’re
told we can’t have them, and when the citizens of that country try to get
those protections, they’re met with force from the company to keep that
from happening.”
After the confrontation at
Los Álamos, a Chicago-based labor rights group, the U.S./Labor Education
in the Americas Project, began pressing Costco, a distributor of Bonita
bananas, to lean on Mr. Noboa to improve labor conditions.
Under pressure, his banana
company has promised to improve medical services, provide masks, gloves
and other equipment and settle complaints about unpaid overtime wages.
But it has refused to recognize the workers’ unions, Labor Ministry officials
said.
Mr. Noboa, who divides much
of his time between Guayaquil and New York, declined to be interviewed,
and campaign aides did not return phone calls and e-mail messages seeking
comment. But his lawyer, Mr. Pino, said children under 14, who are tightly
restricted from working under Ecuador’s labor laws, did not work at Los
Álamos. “Impossible,” he said in an interview. “To violate the law
cannot be done, and it is not the company policy either.”
Though no one knows exactly
how many children work on the large plantations across Ecuador, Sergio
Seminario, an analyst and former president of the Association of Banana
Exporters, estimated 6,000, with thousands more working on small family
farms.
The Labor Ministry has long
been aware of the problem in the industry, which accounts for 20 percent
of Ecuador’s exports. But Alberto Montalvo, the highest-ranking ministry
official in this region, said it was difficult to root out. “We all believe
in human rights and labor rights,” he said. “It is all very beautiful,
but we also have to recognize that all the members of families have to
work to pay for basic needs.”
The existence of child labor
on plantations is a product of simple arithmetic. Workers receive so little
in part because the wholesalers and retailers abroad reap most of the profits,
particularly with the recent consolidation of huge retail outlets like
Wal-Mart, Costco and Carrefour.
Each 43-pound box of bananas
purchased here by exporters for $2 or $3 goes for $25 in the United States
or Europe. The Ecuadorean grower makes 12 cents on the dollar, according
to the National Association of Banana Growers. “These big chains say, `We
will buy your bananas off the boat, but at our price,’ ” Mr. Seminario
said. “So the exporter has learned that to sell to those chains he must
sell at their price.”
If the growers are squeezed,
the banana workers feel the pain. Their work force is almost entirely nonunion,
and workers are often deliberately shifted from one payroll to another
by growers who set up multiple companies on paper to avoid paying benefits
and higher wages.
The workers and their children
here said difficult conditions had long been the norm at Los Álamos.
The families who live here in Puerto Inca cram themselves into crude cinder-block
houses with tin roofs. Indoor plumbing is rare.
The main earners among several
families said they received $6 to $7 a day within Ecuador’s minimum wage
of $128 a month but were often expected to work six or seven days a week,
failing to earn the overtime pay set by law.
The monthly minimum they
earn falls far short of the $220 the government says a poor family of four
needs to meet basic needs, so children go to work.
“With my husband’s salary,
we did not have enough for school, not enough for food,” said Patricia
Céspedes, explaining why she had pulled her nephew out of school
at age 11 and sent him to work at Mr. Noboa’s hacienda. The boy, Máximo
Gómez, whom Ms. Céspedes has raised since his mother’s death,
is now 14 and a veteran field hand.
Esteban goes to school in
addition to working. But many families say they earn so little that they
must choose which of their children to educate and which to send into the
factories and fields. Such economic necessity keeps 55 percent of Ecuadorean
children from attending secondary school, the World Bank says.
Mr. Noboa remains a frequent
visitor to New York, where, according to his spokesman, Pablo Martínez,
he mingles with the Rockefellers and other luminaries. When his son was
christened at St. Patrick’s Cathedral last year, an event shown on Ecuadorean
television, Robert Kennedy Jr. served as the godfather.
But Mr. Noboa’s great hope
is to reach the presidency, which he failed to win in 1998. Mr. Noboa has
portrayed himself as an outsider whose policies will improve life for most
Ecuadoreans.
He has made no extensive
public remarks about the dispute with the workers at Los Álamos.
In fact, the poor labor conditions and the existence of child workers have
made barely a political ripple here. An investigation of the shootings
at Los Álamos has not led to any arrests, nor has it shed light
on what happened.
Mr. Noboa’s aides say the
troubles on his hacienda are politically motivated efforts to embarrass
him in the midst of a presidential campaign.
“If he wasn’t running for
president and wasn’t the richest man in Ecuador, this wouldn’t be happening,”
Mr. Martínez said.
12 JULY 2002: 3 BILLION
PEOPLE ON THIS PLANET LIVE ON LESS THAN $2 A DAY.
FROM THE
NEW YORKER:
July 10, 2002 | home
MASTER OF DISASTER
by JOHN CASSIDY
A leading economist says
the protesters have a point about the I.M.F.
In 1998, Joseph Stiglitz,
a Columbia professor who shared last year’s Nobel
Prize in Economics, visited
a village in rural Morocco where aid workers had
been encouraging local women
to raise chickens. At the time, Stiglitz was the
chief economist of the World
Bank, the Washington-based lending agency, which
was supporting the project.
It had started out well. The Moroccan government
supplied the villagers with
as many newly hatched chicks as they needed. But at
some point, Stiglitz says,
the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank’s
sister organization, told
the Moroccan government to leave the task of
distributing chicks to private
enterprise. A for-profit firm agreed to supply
the villagers, but it refused
to guarantee the chicks’ survivala policy that
had calamitous consequences.
The impoverished peasants refused to risk what
little money they had on
livestock that were likely to die in large numbers in
infancy, and the nascent
industry withered. When Stiglitz arrived in Morocco,
the chicken coops were empty.
A promising attempt to alleviate poverty had
failed.
It may seem like a long way
from Moroccan chickens to the economic crisis in
Argentina, the recent financial
upheavals in Southeast Asia, the failures of
post-Soviet capitalism,
and anti-globalization protests on the streets of
Seattle and Genoa, but in
“Globalization and Its Discontents” (Norton; $24.95)
Stiglitz argues that all
these matters are related. In promoting private
enterprise wherever it can,
the I.M.F. was following the so-called Washington
Consensus view of economic
development, which sees the expansion of free-market
capitalism as the route
to prosperity. With the backing of the United States
Department of the Treasury,
the I.M.F. urges governments everywhere to
privatize, liberalize, and
retrench. In the past twenty-five years, many
developing countries have
followed this advice, dismantling their public-sector
enterprises and opening
up their economies to international trade and
investment. As a result,
the world has become more interconnected than ever,
with the level of exports,
imports, and cross-border investment all increasing
sharply.
According to classic economic
theory, this expansion of trade and commerce
should have made humanity
a lot better off. Ever since Adam Smith, economists
have generally agreed that
trade is a good thing, because it allows countries to
specialize in what they
do best. This “division of labor” (Smith’s phrase)
raises productivity, which
results in more income to spend on food, health,
education, and consumer
goods. Although some people lose their jobs as the
pattern of trade changes,
the winners gain enough to compensate the losers and
still have some left over
for themselves.
During the nineteen-seventies
and eighties, when countries like South Korea and
Singapore were exporting
their way out of poverty, the theory seemed to be
working as advertised. Globalization,
in Stiglitz’s words, “helped hundreds of
millions of people attain
higher standards of living, beyond what they, or most
economists, thought imaginable.”
During the past decade, however, something has
gone wrong. Since 1990,
the number of people living on less than two dollars a
day has risen by more
than a hundred million, to three billion. The gap between
rich and poor countries
has turned into a chasm. Even relatively prosperous
parts of the developing
world, such as Southeast Asia and Eastern Europe, have
fallen into unprecedented
slumps. “Globalization today is not working for many
of the world’s poor,”
Stiglitz declares. “It is not working for much of the
environment. It is not
working for the stability of the global economy.”
Why not? According to Stiglitz,
the rich countries have hijacked globalization,
using as weapons the I.M.F.,
the World Trade Organization, and other
international bodies that
are supposed to act in the interests of all countries.
These institutions are
“all too often closely aligned with the commercial and
financial interests of
those in the advanced industrial countries,” Stiglitz
writes, and the net effect
of the policies they promote is “to benefit the few
at the expense of the
many, the well-off at the expense of the poor.” The
governments of the rich
countries have pushed developing nations to open their
borders to computers
and banking services but continued to protect their own
farmers and textile workers
from the cheap food and clothes that poor countries
produce. They have supported
the extension of patent agreements that guarantee
high profits for Western
pharmaceutical companies like Pfizer and Merck while
depriving African governments
of the drugs they need to fight an AIDS epidemic.
“The
critics of globalization accuse Western countries of hypocrisy,” Stiglitz
writes,
“and the critics are right.”
If this argument brings to
mind the young protesters who have made a business of
disrupting international
summits, Stiglitz is unapologetic. Until the
anti-globalization movement
came along, “there was little hope for change and no
outlets for complaint,”
he writes. “Some of the protestors went to excesses;
some of the protestors were
arguing for higher protectionist barriers against
the developing countries,
which would have made their plight even worse. But
despite these problems,
it is the trade unionists, students,
environmentalistsordinary
citizensmarching in the streets of Prague, Seattle,
Washington, and Genoa who
have put the need for reform on the agenda of the
developed world.”
As this passage suggests,
Stiglitz is part of a growing heterodoxy that seeks to
define a middle ground between
the Washington Consensus and the more radical
elements of the anti-globalization
movement. The financier and philanthropist
George Soros is part of
the dissenting movement, too, and he has written a pithy
little book, “On Globalization”
(Public Affairs; $20), setting out his views and
his recommendations for
reform. Like Stiglitz, Soros supports globalization in
principle but is dismayed
at the narrow focus among policymakers on expanding
trade and industry. “International
trade and global financial markets are very
good at generating wealth,
but they cannot take care of other social needs, such
as the preservation of peace,
alleviation of poverty, protection of the
environment, labor conditions,
or human rights,” he maintains.
Soros’s book is clearly written,
but it doesn’t carry as much weight as
Stiglitz’s. As a leading
economic theorist and someone who has served in senior
government positions, Stiglitz
has a perspective on his subject which can hardly
be ignored. Within four
years of obtaining his Ph.D., from M.I.T., in 1967, he
had published more than
fifteen academic papers, several of which are now
regarded as seminal. He
has since established himself as an expert in many areas
of economics, including
finance, development, and the public sector.
The common theme running
through Stiglitz’s academic work is that markets often
don’t work in the simplistic
way that is taught in Econ. 101. Because of
complications like asymmetries
of information between buyers and sellers,
markets sometimes fail to
work at all, and the government has to step in. (It
was Stiglitz’s work on asymmetric
information that won him a Nobel Prize.) In
1993, when Stiglitz joined
the White House Council of Economic Advisers, at the
start of the Clinton Administration,
he naïvely thought he saw the chance to
“forge an economic policy
and philosophy that viewed the relationship between
government and markets as
complementary.” Instead, he found that “decisions were
often made because of ideology
and politics. As a result many wrong-headed
actions were taken.”
Stiglitz stayed at the council
for four years, eventually becoming its chairman.
In 1997, he moved a few
hundred yards along Pennsylvania Avenue to the World
Bank. The World Bank and
the I.M.F. had been founded at the end of the Second
World War to promote expansionary
Keynesian policies around the globe, with the
bank focussing on long-term
development and the fund on short-term crisis
management, but they long
ago converted to the tenets of what Stiglitz calls
free-market fundamentalism.
The I.M.F., in particular, seems to revel in its
role as enforcer of the
Washington Consensus. Since countries approach the
I.M.F. only when they are
desperate for money, the fund has a good deal of
leverage, which it uses
to force governments to cut budget deficits, raise
taxes, and close down or
sell off state enterprises. Though these reforms are
sometimes necessary, Stiglitz
maintains that the I.M.F.’s representatives are
often oblivious of the human
suffering they cause. “Modern high-tech warfare is
designed to remove physical
contact: dropping bombs from 50,000 feet ensures
that one does not ‘feel’
what one does,” he writes. “Modern economic management
is similar: from one’s
luxury hotel, one can callously impose policies about
which one would think
twice if one knew the people whose lives one was
destroying.”
The centerpiece of “Globalization
and Its Discontents” is a critical account of
the I.M.F.’s role in the
Asian financial crisis and the Russian transition. The
Asian crisis began in July,
1997, when Thailand devalued its currency, and it
quickly spread throughout
Southeast Asia, plunging the region into the deepest
recession it had seen for
decades. Stiglitz argues that the underlying cause of
the collapse was the misguided
financial liberalization that Washington had
urged upon the Asian countries
during the previous few years.
Countries like Singapore
and South Korea hardly needed economic advice from
anybody. Through a combination
of hard work, high savings rates, and extensive
government intervention,
they had turned themselves into universally admired
models for development.
Between 1950 and 1990, South Korea raised its gross
domestic product per capita
from ninety dollars to forty-four hundred dollars.
As part of the “Asian model”
of development, governments prevented foreign
investors (and domestic
residents) from moving money in and out of their
countries freely. These
restrictions helped prevent damaging swings in exchange
rates; they also kept out
American financial firms, which were eager to expand
in Asia. Beginning in the
early nineteen-nineties, the I.M.F. and the Treasury
Department encouraged the
Asians to remove the restriction on capital movements.
Stiglitz viewed this policy
as an unnecessary sop to Wall Street, but the
Treasury Department overruled
his objections. By the middle of the
nineteen-nineties, South
Korea, Thailand, and most other Asian countries had
heeded Washington’s advice
and abolished controls on money flows. The result was
a speculative boom, with
foreign capital pouring into risky investments. For a
while, the region seemed
to be growing even faster than usual. But, once the
Thai crisis erupted, overseas
investors pulled out their money en masse, causing
financial markets to collapse.
The I.M.F. made the downturn
worse by ordering the stricken countries to raise
interest rates and balance
their budgets in order to restore the confidence of
investors. These austerity
policies had been designed for profligate countries
in Latin America, which
ran big budget deficits and printed too much money. Most
of the Asian countries,
by contrast, had balanced budgets, or even surpluses,
when the crisis struck.
The fact that monetary policy was being tightened during
a recession only spooked
investors more, and the conflagration spread to other
countries, including Malaysia
and Indonesia. Suharto’s government was forced to
cut food and fuel subsidies
in order to meet the I.M.F.’s fiscal targets, and
the subsequent riots ended
up bringing down the dictator. Mahathir bin Mohamad,
the Malaysian Prime Minister,
managed to escape Suharto’s fate only by ignoring
the I.M.F.’s advice. In
the face of bitter opposition from Washington, he
introduced laws that made
it difficult for Malaysians and foreign investors to
send their money abroad.
Far from destroying the Malaysian economy, as some
free-market economists had
predicted, these “capital controls” allowed the
country to recover more
quickly than most of its neighbors.
The Asian financial crisis
never came any closer to most Americans than the
business pages. Yet it was
so severe that some people in the region concluded
that the I.M.F. and the
American government had set out deliberately to weaken a
potential economic rival.
Stiglitz doesn’t go that far, but his judgment is
almost as damning: “The
I.M.F. was not participating in a conspiracy, but it was
reflecting the interests
and ideology of the Western financial community.”
Stiglitz’s analysis of what
happened in Russia will be more controversial. As he
details, the I.M.F. advanced
the country billions of dollars in loans to support
the “shock therapy” that
Boris Yeltsin’s government administered after the
collapse of the Soviet Union.
The therapy involved freeing prices, hawking
state-owned enterprises
to private investors at a discount, and trying to
maintain a strong currency.
Stiglitz argues that these policies were misguided,
and he marshals some depressing
statistics to support his case. Between 1940 and
1946, a period when Hitler’s
Army laid waste to Russia, total industrial
production in the Soviet
Union fell by about a quarter. Between 1990 and 1999,
Russian industrial production
fell by more than half. Though the economy has
recovered somewhat in the
past couple of years, the Russian gross domestic
product is still well below
where it was when the Berlin Wall came down. Poverty
rates are much higher, life
expectancy has fallen (almost unprecedented in a
developed country), and
much of Russia’s industry is in the hands of former
Communists and gangsters.
For Stiglitz, the Russians’ attempt to build
capitalism virtually overnight
was reminiscent of the Bolsheviks’ failed attempt
to impose Socialism after
November, 1917. Just as chaos forced Lenin to retreat
to the halfway station of
the “New Economic Policy,” the dramatic collapse of
the post-Soviet economy
forced the modern-day reformers to back off. In 1998,
the ruble collapsed (despite
another I.M.F. loan) and the Yeltsinites were
eventually replaced by a
former K.G.B. agent, Vladimir Putin.
Is Stiglitz overstating the
case against the I.M.F. here? The proponents of
shock therapy, such as the
Harvard economist Andrei Shleifer, who advised the
Russian government during
the mid-nineteen-nineties, argued that moving rapidly
was the only way to prevent
a Communist resurgence, and that the policy wasn’t
enforced vigorously enough.
Instead of consistently promoting radical change,
Yeltsin vacillated, one
moment supporting reformers like Anatoly Chubais, the
next moment backing conservatives
like Viktor Chernomyrdin. Whatever the merits
of such political considerations,
though, the strictly economic case for the
shock therapy is underwhelming.
Indeed, there is now a consensus among
economists that it is a
mistake to try to create a market economy without first
developing the institutions
necessary for capitalism to function properly, such
as enforceable laws and
a working tax system. Under Putin, the Russian
government is now concentrating
on building just that sort of infrastructure,
and the results are encouraging.
Even the I.M.F. has come to acknowledge the
wisdom of this strategy;
almost everyone agrees that there is no shortcut to
building a modern economy.
Stiglitz commends the gradual
approach that China and Poland have taken toward
liberalizing their economies.
In Poland, one of the best-performing economies in
Eastern Europe in recent
years, the government rejected a key element of the
Washington Consensus: rapid
privatization. Instead of rushing to sell off state
enterprises, the Poles concentrated
on creating a modern legal system and a
social safety net. Only
then did they allow private investors to take over banks
and the like. In China,
too, the government left most of the big state-owned
firms in place, but it created
new firms alongside them by allowing villages and
towns to set up their own
enterprises, often in partnership with foreign
companies. During the nineteen-nineties,
China’s G.D.P. grew at an average
annual rate of about ten
per cent, and its poverty rate dropped dramatically.
“The contrast between what
happened in China and what has happened in countries
like Russia, which bowed
to I.M.F. ideology, could not be starker,” Stiglitz
writes. “In case after case,
it seemed that China, a newcomer to market
economies, was more sensitive
to the incentive effects of its policy decisions
than the I.M.F. was to its.”
“Globalization and Its Discontents”
does have some disappointing omissions,
especially concerning the
author’s own experiences. In the Clinton
Administration, Stiglitz
clashed frequently with Lawrence Summers, the Harvard
economist who served in
the Treasury Department and eventually became the
Secretary of the Treasury.
Summers was far more sympathetic to the Washington
Consensus than Stiglitz
was, and he worked closely with the I.M.F. According to
some people in Washington,
Summers forced Stiglitz out of the World Bank by
demanding his departure
as the price of supporting the reappointment of James
Wolfensohn as the institution’s
president. Yet, apart from a few derogatory
references to Summers’s
role in specific policy debates, Stiglitz makes no
mention of their rivalry,
or of the circumstances surrounding his resignation
from the World Bank.
All of this raises the inevitable
question of how much of the book is
score-settling. It will
not escape I.M.F. officials that Stiglitz is overly
reluctant to criticize the
governments of developing countries for making bad
policies, which have done
at least as much as the I.M.F. to keep poor people
poor. And he surely understates
the difficulties facing the I.M.F. when it goes
into a country where the
stock market and the currency are both plummeting.
What’s more, I.M.F.-led
bailouts can sometimes work, as they did in Mexico.
Still, there is no disputing
Stiglitz and Soros’s central point that global
capitalism has outgrown
its institutional framework. Both authors suggest
reforms that might go some
way toward remedying this situation. First and
foremost, they advocate
restructuring the international institutions, so that
they are more democratic
and effective. The I.M.F.’s voting structure dates back
decades and makes no
sensethe Netherlands has about as many votes as China has.
Stiglitz also recommends
improving banking supervision, changing the
international bankruptcy
laws, reducing the number of I.M.F. bailouts, and
increasing the amount of
aid and debt relief that developing countries receive,
especially those in Africa.
Soros, for his part, thinks international aid should
be increased and that the
World Trade Organization ought to take more account of
issues like workers’ rights,
health and safety, and the environment.
One can debate the particulars
of reform but not the need for it. “Without
reform, the backlash that
has already started will mount and discontent with
globalization will grow,”
Stiglitz writes. “This will be a tragedy for all of
us, and especially for the
billions who might otherwise have benefited.”
11 JULY 2002: KARIN AND
ALIASS ARRIVE IN OAK RIDGE…
Karin Bolender and her donkey
Aliass,
a member of the American
Council of Spotted Asses Inc.,
visited the American Museum
of Science and Energy
Tuesday on their two-day
stop in Oak Ridge.
Quest
brings artist/writer to OR
by Beverly Majors
Oak Ridger staff
Karin Bolender and her friend,
Aliass, stopped in Oak Ridge Tuesday and could be seen Wednesday traveling
toward the Museum of Appalachia in their quest for imagination.
Bolender and Aliass, a donkey,
started their quest in Oxford, Miss., the home of William Faulkner, and
will end their journey in about three weeks in Roanoke, Va.
Bolender said she started
her “literary pilgrimage” after the Sept. 11 terrorist attack on the World
Trade Center. She is a writer who lived about an hour outside of New York
but worked inside the city. On Sept. 9, she had decided to move to Portland,
Ore., and was in the Badlands of Nebraska when she heard about the attack.
She calls her pilgrimage
“an urgent manifestation of the imagination.” and said she has learned
a lot about people and, along with Aliass, has helped open up some people’s
imaginations. She said she has had to turn down invitations from people
wanting to give her a place to sleep.
In Oak Ridge she has visited
the American Museum of Science and Energy and the International Friendship
Bell. She said she decided to stop here because of her interests in the
“historical aspects of Oak Ridge.”
She said she learned of Oak
Ridge from her grandfather, who flew over the “Secret City that was not
on any maps” during the early World War II years while he was in the military.
Bolender said her next stop
will be Knoxville, home to two of her favorite authors, James Agee and
Cormack McCarthy.
“I plan to cross the border
at Bristol,” she said. “I have only three more weeks because Aliass is
due to foal.”
10 JULY 2002: HOW CORPORATE
AMERICA SUPPORTS SPAM.
From the New
York Times:
“Brightmail says the volume
of spam it encounters has almost tripled in the last nine months. The
company adds that 12 to 15 percent of total e-mail traffic is spam; a year
ago, that figure was closer to 7 percent. Brightmail, which maintains a
network of In boxes to attract spam, now records 140,000 spam attacks a
day, each potentially involving thousands of messages, if not millions.
Statistics like these are
supported by anecdotal evidence from computer users, who report that they
are seeing more unwanted e-mail every time they log on. Hounded by spam,
some computer users have simply abandoned e-mail addresses…
Ideally, consumer advocates
want the spam equivalent of the 1991 federal Telephone Consumer Protection
Act, which prohibited prerecorded telemarketing calls and junk faxes. The
trade commission was also given power to enforce the legislation.
A broad anti-spam law has
been approved in Europe. On May 30, the European Parliament passed a ban
on unsolicited commercial messaging. Electronic marketing can be aimed
only at consumers who have given prior consent.
In contrast, more than a
dozen spam-related bills have been introduced in Congress over the last
two years, and most of them have languished. Of the handful that have made
progress, the most recent is the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited
Pornography and Marketing act (a contorted title that yields the acronym
Can Spam), which was unanimously approved by the Senate Commerce Committee
last month. The Can Spam bill would, among other things, let the F.T.C.
impose civil fines up to $10 per unlawful message, require valid “remove
me” options on all e-mail and authorize state attorneys general to bring
lawsuits.
Now it must be voted upon
by the full Senate, and two other independent spam bills are moving slowly
through the House of Representatives. But interest groups are lobbying
to tone down the strongest aspects of spam legislation.
Those lobbyists are not
spammers. They are some of the country’s largest corporations and commercial
associations: Citicorp, Charles Schwab, Procter & Gamble, the National
Retail Federation, the Securities Industry Association and the American
Insurance Association. The groups argue that many of the bills would unfairly
restrict e-mail marketing and put electronic commerce at a disadvantage.
“We would like the bill narrowed
so only pornographic, fraudulent and deceptive spam are targeted,” said
John Savercool, the vice president of federal affairs for the American
Insurance Association. “We think that is where the consumer angst is.”
But Senator Conrad Burns
of Montana, a Republican sponsor of the Can Spam bill, says that consumer
frustration goes beyond pornography and fraud. “I get enough applications
for credit cards, offers to consolidate my debt and advertising for Viagra
in my mailbox,” he said. “I don’t need it on my computer too.”
09 JULY 2002: Walter
Benjamin on the flâneur
FROM “FRAGMENTS
OF THE PASSENGWERK”:
“There was the pedestrian
who wedged himself into the crowd, but there was also the flâneur
who demanded elbow room and was unwilling to forego the life of the gentleman
of leisure. His leisurely appearance as a personality is his protest against
the division of labour which makes people into specialists. it was also
his protest against their industriousness. Around 1840 it was briefly fashionable
to take turtles for a walk in the arcades. the flâneurs liked to
have the turtles set the pace for them.” 1938
“The street becomes a dwelling
for the flâneur; he is as much at home among the facades of houses
as a citizen is in his four walls. To him the shiny, enamelled signs of
businesses are at least as good a wall ornament as an oil painting is to
the bourgeois in his salon. The walls are the desk against which he presses
his notebooks; news-stands are his libraries and the terraces of cafés
are the balconies from which he looks down on his household after his work
is done.”1938
“The crowd was the veil from
behind which the the familiar city as phantasmagoria beckoned to the flâneur.
In it, the city was now landscape, now a room. And both of these went into
the construction of the department store, which made use of flânerie
itself in order to sell goods. The department store was the flâneur’s
final coup. As flâneurs, the intelligensia came into the market place.
As they thought, to observe it – but in reality it was already to find
a buyer. In this intermediary stage…they took the form of the bohème;.
To the uncertainty of their economic position corresponded the uncertainty
of their political function.” 1935
“These writings were socially
dubious, too. The long series of eccentric or simple, attractive or severe
figures which the physiology presented to the public in character sketches
had one thing in common: they were harmless and of perfect bonhomie. Such
a view of one’s fellow man was so remote from experience that there were
bound to be uncommonly weighty motives for it. The reason was an uneasiness
of a special sort. People had to adapt themselves to a new and rather strange
situation, one that is peculiar to big cities. Simmel has felicitously
formulated what was involved here. ‘Someone who sees without hearing is
much more uneasy than someone who hears without seeing. In this there is
something characteristic of the sociology of the big city. Interpersonal
relationships in big cities are distinguished by a marked preponderance
of the activity of the eye over the activity of the ear. The main reason
for this is the public means of transportation. Before the development
of buses, railroads and trams in the nineteenth century, people had never
been in a position of having to look at one another for long minutes or
even hours without speaking to one another’.”1938
“On his peregrinations the
man of the crowd lands at a late hour in a department store where there
are still many customers. He moves about like someone who knows his way
around the place…If the arcade is the classical form of the intérieur,
which is how the flâneur sees the street, the department store is
the form of the intérieur’s decay. The bazaar is the last hangout
of the flâneur. if in the beginning the street had become an intérieur
for him, now this intérieur turned into a street, and he roamed
through the labyrinth of merchandise as he had once roamed through the
labyrinth of the city…The flâneur is someone abandoned in the crowd.
in this he shares the situation of the commodity.”1938
THANKS TO JOHN C.!
THE INTERNET DEBACLE – AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW
Originally written for Performing
Songwriter Magazine, May 2002
* Shortly after this article
was turned in, Michael Greene resigned as president of NARAS.
“The Internet, and downloading, are here to stay… Anyone who thinks otherwise should prepare themselves to end up on the slagheap of history.” (Janis Ian during a live European
radio interview, 9-1-98) *Please see author’s note at end!
When I research an article,
I normally send 30 or so emails to friends and acquaintances asking for
opinions and anecdotes. I usually receive 10-20 in reply. But not so on
this subject!
I sent 36 emails requesting
opinions and facts on free music downloading from the Net. I stated that
I planned to adopt the viewpoint of devil’s advocate: free Internet downloads
are good for the music industry and its artists.
I’ve received, to date, over
300 replies, every single one from someone legitimately “in the music business.”
What’s more interesting than
the emails are the phone calls. I don’t know anyone at NARAS (home of the
Grammy Awards), and I know Hilary Rosen (head of rhe Recording Industry
Association of America, or RIAA) only vaguely. Yet within 24 hours of sending
my original email, I’d received two messages from Rosen and four from NARAS
requesting that I call to “discuss the article.”
Huh. Didn’t know I was that
widely read.
Ms. Rosen, to be fair, stressed
that she was only interested in presenting RIAA’s side of the issue, and
was kind enough to send me a fair amount of statistics and documentation,
including a number of focus group studies RIAA had run on the matter.
However, the problem with
focus groups is the same problem anthropologists have when studying peoples
in the field – the moment the anthropologist’s presence is known, everything
changes. Hundreds of scientific studies have shown that any experimental
group wants to please the examiner. For focus groups, this is particularly
true. Coffee and donuts are the least of the pay-offs.
The NARAS people were a bit
more pushy. They told me downloads were “destroying sales”, “ruining the
music industry”, and “costing you money”.
Costing me money? I don’t
pretend to be an expert on intellectual property law, but I do know one
thing. If a music industry executive claims I should agree with their agenda
because it will make me more money, I put my hand on my wallet?and check
it after they leave, just to make sure nothing’s missing.
Am I suspicious of all this
hysteria? You bet. Do I think the issue has been badly handled? Absolutely.
Am I concerned about losing friends, opportunities, my 10th Grammy nomination
by publishing this article? Yeah. I am. But sometimes things are just wrong,
and when they’re that wrong, they have to be addressed.
The premise of all this ballyhoo
is that the industry (and its artists) are being harmed by free downloading.
Nonsense. Let’s take it from
my personal experience. My site (www.janisian.com ) gets an average of
75,000 hits a year. Not bad for someone whose last hit record was in 1975….
[CONTINUED AT JANIS
IAN’S WEBSITE.]
THANKS TO J. LEWIS!
June 30, 2002
Commentary / Edward Monks: The end of
fairness: Right-wing commentators have a
virtual monopoly when it comes to talk
radio programming
By EDWARD MONKS
For The Register-Guard
ONCE UPON A TIME, in a country that now seems
far away, radio and television broadcasters had an
obligation to operate in the public interest. That
generally accepted principle was reflected in a rule
known as the Fairness Doctrine.
The rule, formally adopted by the Federal Communications
Commission in 1949, required all broadcasters to devote a
reasonable amount of time to the discussion of controversial
matters of public interest. It further required broadcasters to air
contrasting points of view regarding those matters. The Fairness
Doctrine arose from the idea embedded in the First Amendment that
the wide dissemination of information from diverse and even
antagonistic sources is essential to the public welfare and to a
healthy democracy.
The FCC is mandated by federal law to grant broadcasting licenses
in such a way that the airwaves are used in the “public
convenience, interest or necessity.” The U.S. Supreme Court in
1969 unanimously upheld the constitutionality of the Fairness
Doctrine, expressing the view that the airwaves were a “public
trust” and that “fairness” required that the public trust accurately
reflect opposing views.
However, by 1987 the Fairness Doctrine was gone – repealed by
the FCC, to which President Reagan had appointed the majority of
commissioners.
That same year, Congress codified the doctrine in a bill that
required the FCC to enforce it. President Reagan vetoed that bill,
saying the Fairness Doctrine was “inconsistent with the tradition of
independent journalism.” Thus, the Fairness Doctrine came to an
end both as a concept and a rule.
Talk radio shows how profoundly the FCC’s repeal of the Fairness
Doctrine has affected political discourse. In recent years almost all
nationally syndicated political talk radio hosts on commercial
stations have openly identified themselves as conservative,
Republican, or both: Rush Limbaugh, Michael Medved, Michael
Reagen, Bob Grant, Ken Hamblin, Pat Buchanan, Oliver North,
Robert Dornan, Gordon Liddy, Sean Hannity, Michael Savage, et al.
The spectrum of opinion on national political commercial talk radio
shows ranges from extreme right wing to very extreme right wing –
there is virtually nothing else.
On local stations, an occasional nonsyndicated moderate or liberal
may sneak through the cracks, but there are relatively few such
exceptions. This domination of the airwaves by a single political
perspective clearly would not have been permissible under the
Fairness Doctrine.
Eugene is fairly representative. There are two local commercial
political talk and news radio stations: KUGN, owned by Cumulus
Broadcasting, the country’s second largest radio broadcasting
company, and KPNW, owned by Clear Channel Communications,
the largest such company.
KUGN’s line-up has three highly partisan conservative Republicans –
Lars Larson (who is regionally syndicated), Michael Savage and
Michael Medved (both of whom are nationally syndicated), covering
a nine-hour block each weekday from 1 p.m. until 10 p.m. Each host
is unambiguous in his commitment to advancing the interests and
policies of the Republican party, and unrelenting in his highly
personalized denunciation of Democrats and virtually all Democratic
Party policy initiatives. That’s 45 hours a week.
For two hours each weekday morning, KUGN has just added
nationally syndicated host Bill O’Reilly. Although he occasionally
criticizes a Republican for something other than being insufficiently
conservative, O’Reilly is clear in his basic conservative viewpoint.
His columns are listed on the Townhall.com web site, created by
the strongly conservative Heritage Foundation. That’s 55 hours of
political talk on KUGN each week by conservatives and Republicans.
No KUGN air time is programmed for a Democratic or liberal political
talk show host.
KPNW carries popular conservative Rush Limbaugh for three hours
each weekday, and Michael Reagan, the conservative son of the
former president, for two hours, for a total of 25 hours per week.
Thus, between the two stations, there are 80 hours per week,
more than 4,000 hours per year, programmed for Republican and
conservative hosts of political talk radio, with not so much as a
second programmed for a Democratic or liberal perspective.
For anyone old enough to remember 15 years earlier when the
Fairness Doctrine applied, it is a breathtakingly remarkable change
– made even more remarkable by the fact that the hosts whose
views are given this virtual monopoly of political expression spend
a great deal of time talking about “the liberal media.”
Political opinions expressed on talk radio are approaching the level
of uniformity that would normally be achieved only in a totalitarian
society, where government commissars or party propaganda
ministers enforce the acceptable view with threats of violence.
There is nothing fair, balanced or democratic about it. Yet the
almost complete right wing Republican domination of political talk
radio in this country has been accomplished without guns or
gulags. Let’s see how it happened.
As late as 1974, the FCC was still reporting that “we regard strict
adherence to the Fairness Doctrine as the single most important
requirement of operation in the public interest – the sine qua non
for grant for renewal of license.” That view had been ratified by the
U.S. Supreme Court, which wrote In glowing terms in 1969 of the
people’s right to a free exchange of opposing views on the public
airwaves:
“But the people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by
radio and their collective right to have the medium function
consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment. It
is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the
broadcasters, which is paramount,” the court said. “Congress need
not stand idly by and permit those with licenses to ignore the
problems which beset the people or to exclude from the airwaves
anything but their own views of fundamental questions.”
Through 1980, the FCC, the majority in Congress and the U. S.
Supreme Court all supported the Fairness Doctrine. It was the
efforts of an interesting collection of conservative Republicans (with
some assistance from liberals such Sen. William Proxmire, a
Wisconsin Democrat, and well-respected journalists such as Fred
Friendly) that came together to quickly kill it.
The position of the FCC dramatically changed when President
Reagan appointed Mark Fowler as chairman in 1981. Fowler was a
lawyer who had worked on Reagan’s campaign, and who
specialized in representing broadcasters. Before his nomination,
which was well received by the broadcast industry, Fowler had
been a critic of the Fairness Doctrine. As FCC chairman, Fowler
made clear his opinion that “the perception of broadcasters as
community trustees should be replaced by a view of broadcasters
as marketplace participants.” He quickly put in motion of series of
events leading to two court cases that eased the way for repeal of
the Fairness Doctrine six years later.
At almost the same time, Sen. Bob Packwood, R-Ore., who became
chairman of the Commerce Committee when Republicans took
control of the Senate in 1981, began holding hearings designed to
produce “evidence” that the Fairness Doctrine did not function as
intended.
Packwood also established the Freedom of Expression Foundation,
described by its president, Craig Smith, long associated with
Republican causes, as a “foundation which would coordinate the
repeal effort using non-public funds, and which could provide
lobbyists, editorialists and other opinion leaders with needed
arguments and evidence.”
Major contributors to the foundation included the major broadcast
networks, as well as Philip Morris, Anheuser-Busch, AT&T and
TimesMirror.
Packwood and the foundation argued that the Fairness Doctrine
chilled or limited speech because broadcasters became reluctant to
carry opinion-oriented broadcasts out of fear that many
organizations or individuals would demand the opportunity to
respond. The argument, which appealed to some liberals such as
Proxmire, thus held that the doctrine, in practice, decreased the
diversity of opinion expressed on public airwaves.
In 1985, the FCC formally adopted the views advanced by
Packwood and the foundation, issuing what was termed a
“Fairness Report,” which contained a “finding” that the Fairness
Doctrine in actuality “inhibited” broadcasters and that it “disserves
the interest of the public in obtaining access to diverse viewpoints.”
Congress, and much of the rest of the country, remained
unconvinced.
Shortly thereafter, in a 2-1 decision in 1986, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld a new FCC rule refusing
to apply the Fairness Doctrine to teletext (the language appearing
at the bottom of a television screen). The two-judge majority
decided that Congress had not made the Fairness Doctrine a
binding statutory obligation despite statutory language supporting
that inference. The two judges were well-known conservatives
Antonin Scalia and Robert Bork, each thereafter nominated to the
U.S. Supreme Court by President Reagan. Their ruling became the
beginning of the end for the Fairness Doctrine.
The next year, 1987, in the case Meredith Corp. vs. FCC, the FCC
set itself up to lose in such a way as to make repeal of the Fairness
Doctrine as easy as possible. The opinion of the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals took note of the commission’s intention to
undercut the Fairness Doctrine:
“Here, however, the Commission itself has already largely
undermined the legitimacy of its own rule. The FCC has issued a
formal report that eviscerates the rationale for its regulations. The
agency has deliberately cast grave legal doubt on the fairness
doctrine. …”
The court was essentially compelled to send the case back to the
FCC for further proceedings, and the commission used that
opportunity to repeal the Fairness Doctrine. Although there have
been several congressional attempts to revive the doctrine,
Reagan’s veto and the stated opposition of his successor, George
Bush, were successful in preventing that.
It is difficult to underestimate the consequences of repeal of the
Fairness Doctrine on the American political system. In 1994, when
Republicans gained majorities in both chambers of Congress, Newt
Gingrich, soon to become speaker of the House, described the
voting as “the first talk radio election.”
Although it is not susceptible to direct proof, it seems clear to me
that if in communities throughout the United States Al Gore had
been the beneficiary of thousands of hours of supportive talk show
commentary and George W. Bush the victim of thousands of hours
of relentless personal and policy attack, the vote would have been
such that not even the U.S. Supreme Court could have made Bush
president.
Broadcasters’ choice to present conservative views is not purely
about attracting the largest number of listeners. Broadcasters and
their national advertisers tend to be wealthy corporations and
entities, operated and owned by wealthy individuals. Virtually all
national talk show hosts advocate a reduction or elimination of
taxes affecting the wealthy. They vigorously argue for a reduction
in income taxes, abolition of the estate tax and reduction or
elimination of the capital gains tax – positions directly consistent
with the financial interests of broadcasters and advertisers.
Imagine a popular liberal host who argued for a more steeply
graduated income tax, an increase in the tax rate for the largest
estates and an increase in the capital gains tax rate.
Broadcasters and advertisers have no interest in such a host, no
matter how large the audience, because of the host’s ability to
influence the political climate in a way that broadcasters and
advertisers ultimately find to be economically unfavorable.
Hence we wind up with a distortion of a true market system in
which only conservatives compete for audience share. Whether the
theory is that listeners listen to hear views they agree with, or
views they disagree with, in a purely market driven arena,
broadcasters would currently be scrambling to find liberal or
progressive talk show hosts. They are not.
The beneficiaries of the talk show monopoly are not content.
Immediately after he became House speaker, Newt Gingrich led the
Republican battle to eliminate federal funding for the Corporation
for Public Broadcasting, which, free of some commercial
considerations, had broadcast a wider spectrum of opinion.
Although not fully successful, that campaign led to a decrease in
federal funding for the CPB, a greater reliance on corporate
“sponsors” and a drift toward programming acceptable to
conservatives.
No reasonable person can claim that the repeal of the Fairness
Doctrine has led to a wider diversity of views – to a “warming” of
speech, as the FCC, the Freedom of Expression Foundation and
others had predicted.
Perhaps it should not be a surprise that the acts of President
Reagan, Reagan’s FCC appointments, Sen. Packwood, Justice Scalia
and failed Supreme Court nominee Bork and the first President
Bush should combine to ultimately produce, in my town, a 4,000
hour to zero yearly advantage for Republican propaganda over the
Democratic opposition.Nor should we overlook the Orwellian irony
that the efforts of an organization calling itself the Freedom of
Expression Foundation helped result in so limited a range of public
expression of views.
Perhaps the current president, aware that the repeal of the
Fairness Doctrine had the opposite effect of what was publicly
predicted by his predecessors and aware that a monopoly on public
expression is inconsistent with a democratic tradition, will direct his
administration to reinstate the Fairness Doctrine. What about that
cold day in hell?
Edward Monks is a Eugene attorney.
COURTESY: J. LEWIS!